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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
Jurisdiction of this case is proper under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2 (4) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court property grant Appellee's

Motion for Summary Judgment where Appellant failed to provide any
support for his claim that the Krugerrands were a gift to him?
2.

Did the District Court properly grant Appellee's

Motion for Summary Judgment where Appellant failed to provide
support for his claim that he was entitled to deduct from rents due
repairs he claimed to be making on a duplex rented to him?
3.

Did the trial court judge abuse her discretion in

denying Appellant's motion to amend his Answer to plead the
affirmative defense of statute of limitations?
4.

Did the trial court judge abused her discretion in

denying Appellant's Motion for a jury or advisory jury?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, testimony,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rule Civ. Pro. 56(c) . Where no
material facts remain unresolved, the Appeals Court will examine
the

trial

correctness.
131855

court's

conclusions

of

law

and

review

them

Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
1

for

The standard o± review of a denial to amend pleadings is
abuse of discretion. Granting or denying leave to amend a pleading
is within the broad discretion of the trial court and an appeals
court will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of an abuse
of discretion.

Girard v. Appelby. 660 P.2d 245 (1983).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 38(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from the lower court's ruling that
David Cahoon, the Appellant, had converted 159 gold Krugerrand
coins belonging to Glen Cahoon and had failed to pay rents due on
a duplex rented to him.
A*

Course of Proceedings
1.

On September 23, 1991, Marion Cahoon filed a

Petition for Guardianship of her husband Glen Cahoon.
2.

On

October

14,

1991, David

Cahoon,

Glen

Cahoon's son from a prior marriage, filed an objection to Marion
Cahoon's petition for guardianship.
3.

On December 11, 1991, a hearing was held before

the Honorable Homer Wilkinson at which time Glen Cahoon, Marion
Cahoon and David Cahoon all testified.

Judge Wilkinson held that

while Glen Cahoon was competent to testify he needed assistance to
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protect his interests, and appointed Marion Cahoon as his guardian.
Record at 583.
4.

Based upon the testimony at the guardianship

hearing, Marion Cahoon filed a complaint against David Cahoon for
the conversion of 159 gold Krugerrand coins and for the non-payment
of rent on property (hereinafter referred to as the "Duplex") which
Glen Cahoon owned and rented to David Cahoon.
5.

Record at 2-6.

On February 14, 1992, David Cahoon filed his

answer and a counterclaim which is not part of this appeal. Record
at 27-29.
6.

On April 15, 1992, Marion Cahoon filed a motion

to consolidate for purposes of discovery and taking of evidence, so
that the evidence and testimony taken in the guardianship hearing
on December 11, 1991 would be made part of the civil action record.
The motion was granted on May 13, 1992. Record at 38-40 and 47.
7.

On July 30, 1992, Marion Cahoon filed a motion

for summary judgment based in large part upon the testimony taken
at the December 11, 1991 hearing before Judge Wilkinson.

The

motion for summary judgment was set for hearing on October 21, 1992
and then rescheduled for on November 13. Record at 53-54 and 142144.
8.

On October 29, 1992, David Cahoon filed a

motion to amend his answer to the complaint to include a statute of

131855
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limitations defense. No arguments or memorandum in support of this
motion were filed.
9.
Judge Leslie A.
judgment.

Record at 150.
On November 13, 1992, a hearing was held before
Lewis on the Appellee's motion

for summary

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted

Marion Cahoon's motion for summary judgment with respect to the
back rent and took under advisement
Krugerrands.

the conversation of the

Record at 163.
10.

On December 2, 1992, the court ruled that David

Cahoon had failed to carry his burden of proof that the Krugerrand
coins were a gift to him and that he had converted the coins. The
court also ruled that the number of coins converted was at issue
and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to take testimony with regard
to the number of coins converted.
11.

Record at 197, 247-252.

On December 10, 1992 the court entered an order

denying David Cahoon's motion to amend his answer to include a
statute of limitations defense.
12.

Record at 202.

On December 24, 1992, David Cahoon filed a

motion requesting a jury trial or an advisory jury. Record at 242.
13.

On December 30, 1992, a hearing was held before

Judge Leslie Lewis on David Cahoon's request for a jury trial and
his objections to findings of fact and conclusions of law from the
November 13 hearing.

At that time, the court entered modified

findings of fact and conclusions of law, denied defendant's request
for a jury trial and scheduled the hearing to take evidence on the
131855
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number and value of Krugerrands for February 11, 1993. Record at
246-251.
14.

On February 11, 1993, the evidentiary hearing

regarding the number and value of the converted Krugerrands began.
The hearing continued to February 24, 1993. The court found that
the defendant had converted 159 Krugerrands and ordered him to
return the Krugerrands

or to pay

the plaintiff

their value

determined to be $73,580.22 plus statutory interest.

Record at

272-280.
B.

Disposition in the Court Below

The

trial

court, based

upon

the

testimony

at

the

evidentiary hearing before Judge Wilkinson and the hearing on the
Motion for Summary Judgment, and David Cahoon's failure to support
his claims of a gift, granted summary judgment with regard to the
conversion of the Krugerrand coins, and the non-payment of rents on
the Duplex.

The trial court held another evidentiary hearing to

determine the issue of the number of coins and their value at which
time both Appellee and Appellant submitted additional evidence.
After testimony and argument from both parties, the trial court
found that the number of coins converted was 159 coins

(the

Appellee having returned seven coins) and that the value of the
converted coins was $73,580.22 plus statutory interest from the
date of conversion.

131855
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In May,

Krugerrand coins.
2.

1979, Glen

Cahoon purchased

166 gold

Record at 56, 62, 558.

In December, 1979, Glen Cahoon delivered possession

of the coins to his son David Cahoon and instructed David to bury
the coins underneath the Duplex owned by Glen Cahoon and rented to
David Cahoon.

Record at 57-60, 530-531, 570, 574.

3.

On December 3, 1979, Glen Cahoon married Marion

4.

In approximately 1981, David Cahoon, without Glen

Cahoon.

Cahoon's knowledge or consent, dug up the coins (Record at 62-65,
70-71, 572-574) and used them for his own needs. Record at 62-65,
70-71, 574-575.
5.

In January,

1985, Glen

Cahoon

informed

Marion

Cahoon, his wife, of the coins buried under the Duplex. Record at
60-62, 547, 550.
6.

On September 23, 1991, Marion Cahoon petitioned for

appointment as guardian of Glen B. Cahoon.

On October 14, 1991,

David Cahoon filed an objection to Marion Cahoon's appointment. On
December 11, 1991 a hearing was held before Judge Wilkinson at
which time Glen Cahoon testified that all of the Krugerrands were
buried under the Duplex in three five gallon plastic boxes. Record
at 58, 530-531.

Glen also testified that he had not given the

Krugerrands to David.

Record at 59, 531. Glen testified that he

believed that the Krugerrands were still buried underneath the
131855
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Duplex and that he was saving them for his old age. Record at 59,
531, 534.

David Cahoon testified that he buried the Krugerrands

under the Duplex at his father's instruction and he subsequently
dug them up and used them for his own purposes.
570.

Record at 62-65,

David claimed that the coins were given to him as a gift.

Record at 65, 574.
7.

On December 11, 1991, Judge Wilkinson found

that Glen Cahoon was competent to give testimony but needed a
conservator/guardian to protect his interests and appointed Marion
Cahoon as his guardian/conservator.

Record at 583.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The district court was correct in granting Marion

Cahoon's motion for summary judgment with respect to the question
of a gift where the uncontradicted evidence and testimony of the
donor, Glen Cahoon was that no gift was intended.
531.

Record at 59,

There was no testimony by David Cahoon which would support

his claim that the coins were a "gift" to him.

David testified

that he was instructed by Glen Cahoon to "hold these".

Record at

64, 574.
2.

The district court was correct in granting Marion

Cahoon's motion for summary judgment with respect to the rents due
on the Duplex because David Cahoon failed, prior to the hearing on
the motion for summary judgment, to produce any evidence or support
for his claim that he was entitled to make improvements or repairs
to the property and offset his rents due against such improvement
131855
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or repairs without the prior approval of Glen Cahoon or the
Conservator.

The only evidence before the Court was that David

Cahoon had not paid the rents due and neither Glen Cahoon nor
Marion Cahoon had authorized him to make improvements or repairs.
Record at 78-79.
3.

The district court's denial of Appellant's motion to

amend his complaint to include a statute of limitations defense was
not an abuse of discretion where the motion was filed after the
motion for summary judgment had been filed and just days before the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The Appellant did not
file a proposed amended answer nor did Appellant present any
testimony or any evidence in support of his motion to amend.

All

of the facts which were before the court were known to the
Appellant for eight months prior to the hearing date.

Further,

based upon the evidence before the trial court, it was unlikely
that the statute of limitations defense could be successfully
argued where the protected person and guardian both believed that
Appellant, David Cahoon still had possession of the coins and did
not discover that he had converted them to his own use until the
December 11, 1991 guardianship hearing.
578.

Upon discovering

that David

Record at 59, 531, 575,

Cahoon had

converted

the

Krugerrands to his own use, the guardian promptly instituted this
action for conversion.
4.

The district court under Rule 38(d) properly denied

Appellant's motion for a jury trial on an advisory jury where the
131855
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motion was not made until after the court had already ruled on
several of the primary issues and had scheduled a hearing date to
try the issue of the number of coins and their value, which is
tantamount to asking for a jury in the middle of the trial.
5.

Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence based

upon the record below and attempted to support his appeal by citing
evidence which is not a part of the record below and was not before
the trial court. Throughout his brief the Appellant cites as facts
deposition testimony of Marion Cahoon which is not a part of the
record below nor was it part of the testimony before the trial
court. He states as fact findings of the court which are contrary
to the record.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO PRODUCE
EVIDENCE THAT RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT.
The uncontroverted evidence before the court was that

Glen Cahoon had purchased the gold coins and hid them away for his
old age.

Record at 59-60, 531, 534, 550.

When asked if he had

given the Krugerrands to David Cahoon, he answered "No, I did not
give them to David.
can get them.

They belong to me. And anytime I need them I

If I need them I can go over and get them."

at 59, 531.

131855
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Record

When David Cahoon testified with regard to his claim that
the coins were given to him, there was no testimony given which
would support a clear and unequivocal gift.

He testified "They

were given to me. He (Glen) said 'Hold these' and I did."

Record

at 64, 574. In addition, when pressed the following exchange took
place:
Q

Let's define "give them". He gave possession of
them to you, but did he give title of them to you?
Did he give you title to the coins? Did he make a
gift to you? Isn't that what you told me that they
were yours?

A

Well there
give him a
of sale or
exchanged.
to me.

Q

Any instructions?
them?

A

Right.

wasn't any dispute, you know. I didn't
receipt, he didn't give me any condition
any kind of thing. There were no papers
All there was was the goods were handed
Did your father tell you to bury

And that's what I did.

Id.
This exchange clearly indicates that there was no clear
and unequivocal expression of a gift.
Under Utah law a donee has a burden of proving an inter
vivos gift by "clear and convincing evidence." Sims v. George, 466
P.2d 831, 835 (1970) ("one so claiming a gift from another must
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence").

In this case,

where the donor was still alive and testifies that no gift was made
or intended and the donee does not present any testimony or other
evidence of the intent to make a present gift, the trial court was
131855
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correct in granting summary judgment as a matter of law.

It is

plain that the Appellant has failed to meet his burden under rule
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to produce evidence that
raises any genuine issue of material fact.

Rule 56(e) is quite

clear concerning this burden:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule an adverse
party may not rest upon its mere allegations
or denials of his pleadings but his response,
by affidavits or otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so response, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e).
This rule is also explicit that "opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein."

These

requirements are well recognized and emphasize in Utah decisions.
See A.P. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corporation, 820 P.2d 916,
919 (Utah 1991) ("allegations of a pleading or factual conclusion
of an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact."); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990)
("bear allegations unsupported by any facts are not sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment"); Massey v. Utah Power &
Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980) (same).
Appellant's response to Appellee's motion for summary
judgment failed to meet these standards.
131855
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Despite Appellee's

memorandum of law and supporting affidavits

(Record at 55-80),

Appellant produced no affidavit or other evidence that raised any
issue of material fact. All that Appellant can marshall to oppose
the facts established by Appellee are unsupported allegations.
The court properly granted summary judgment with respect
to the unpaid back rents because David Cahoon failed to support his
claim that he was entitled to make improvements or repairs to the
Duplex and deduct the cost of those repairs including his time
which he charged at $10 an hour against rents due.

These repair

charges were not authorized by Glen Cahoon or Marion Cahoon after
she was appointed guardian.
II.

Record at 78-79.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHERE IT REFUSED TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT OF THE
PLEADINGS WHEN NOTHING NEW OR OF SUBSTANCE WAS
CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT.
Appellant's motion to amend his answer to the complaint

to include a statute of limitations defense was a two-sentence
motion

without

any

supporting

affidavits, memoranda,

law or

testimony nor did the Appellant submit a copy of the proposed
amended answer with the motion. Record at 150. Appellant does not
cite to any deposition or other testimony to prove his point nor
does he cite any case law to support the proposition that he should
be allowed to amend his answer.

Under the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, David Cahoon had already waived his opportunity to
assert such a defense.

Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

states as follows:
131855
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(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a
proceeding pleading a party may set forth
affirmative accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharged in bankruptcy,
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration,"
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servants,
laches,
license, payment,
release, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter
constituting an avoidance for affirmative
defense.
If a party does not assert such defenses then they are deemed
waived under Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all
defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion as hereinbefore
provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply.
In this case Appellant was aware of all of the evidence
which would allow him to plead a statute of limitations defense
eight months before the filing of his motion.

In his brief,

Appellant argues that the statute of limitations began to run in
1985 when Marion Cahoon was told by her husband Glen that he had
buried

$48,000

worth

of

gold

Krugerrands

under

the Duplex.

Appellant's Brief p. 21-22. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(5) provides:
" . . . that the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved
party knows or reasonably should have known of harm suffered."
Under this statute, an aggrieved party must know of the facts
giving rise to the claim before the statute of limitation begins to
run.
131855

In this case, Marion Cahoon and Glen Cahoon both believed
13

that the gold Krugerrands were still buried underneath the Duplex.
Record at 59-60, 531. It was not until David Cahoon testified that
he had dug the Krugerrands up and had begun spending them that they
discovered that a conversion had taken place.
574-575.

Record at 64-65,

This evidence was presented at the hearing on December

11, 1991, before Judge Wilkinson. Prior to that date, neither Glen
Cahoon nor Marion Cahoon had any knowledge of David Cahoon7s
wrongful acts. Based upon this evidence which was before the trial
Court and David Cahoon's failure to support his motion to amend,
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's
motion.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A JURY
TRIAL.
Appellant David Cahoon filed his answer to Appellee's
complaint on February 11, 1992. Appellant did not request a jury
trial in that pleading and accordingly did not pay the statutory
jury fee. On November 13, 1992, Marion Cahoon's motion for summary
judgment on all issues was heard by the court.

At that time the

court could have decided all the issues raised by this case. Even
though the court could have ruled as to all issues, defendant still
did not file a jury demand and still had not paid any requisite
jury fee.
On December 2, 1992, the court entered its order which,
along with the court's previous ruling, decided the entire case
except for determining the value and number of the Krugerrands
131855
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converted by the defendant. A hearing was set to hear the evidence
on that issue.
On December

24, 1992, more

than

ten months

after

defendant filed his answer and less than one week before the
scheduled hearing on the final issue, defendant requested a jury
trial by way of a one sentence pleading filed with the court.
Record at 242.
Rule 38(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any
issue triable of right of a jury by paying the
statutory jury fee and serving upon the other
parties a demand therefor in writing at any
time after the commencement of the action but
not later than ten days after the service of
the last pleading directed to such issue.
Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of
the party.
Under Rule 38(b), defendant was required to pay the
statutory jury fee of $50.00 and serve upon plaintiff a jury demand
not later than ten days after the service of defendant's answer
which occurred on February 11, 1992. Therefore, defendant had not
complied with Rule 38(b).

By not complying with Rule 38(b), the

defendant is subject to Rule 38(d) which states, "The failure of a
party to pay the statutory fee, to serve the demand as required by
this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5 (d) constitutes a
waiver by him of trial by jury."
Pursuant to the applicable rules, Appellant waived his
right to a trial by jury and his motion was properly denied by the
trial court.
131855
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The Appellant's one-sentence request for a jury trial
also appears to offer the Court the alternative of providing an
advisory jury for the purpose of ruling on the one remaining issue
in this matter.

Because Appellant chose not to provide any

citations to his motion, Appellee must assume that the type of
advisory jury which Appellant refers is provided in Rule 39(c),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

"In all actions not

triable of right by a jury, the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or the consent
of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has
the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right."
Under the rule, an advisory jury may be utilized in
actions not triable of right by jury.

In this case, the remaining

issue is one which was triable by right so long as Appellant had
properly complied with the applicable rule.
Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Rule 38, Utah

Advisory juries are generally used to

advise on questions of equity which are not triable by right.
There was no equitable issue outstanding.

See e.g., Romrell v.

Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980) . If a jury may
properly sit in a case, as in this case if the defendant had
complied with the applicable rules, there is no need for an
advisory jury.
In sum, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in
refusing to grant Appellant's motion for a jury trial. The motion
was made long after the evidence was presented to the court, the
131855
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court had ruled on several of the issues and the court had
scheduled a hearing ten days hence to consider the final issues.
IV.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
BASED UPON THE RECORD BELOW AND MADE
ASSERTIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Throughout his brief Appellant cites portions of Marion
Cahoon's deposition which were not a part of the pleadings, were
not before the trial court, and were not made a part of the record
below.

See Appellant's Brief at page 4, Statement of Facts,
In addition, Appellant states as fact that the Court

found Glen Cahoon incompetent when in fact the Court found Glen
Cahoon incapacitated but competent to give testimony and that he
was able to give truthful answers and understood the questions.
Record at 583.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(a)(2),
provides that if Appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding
or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence
Appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant to such finding or conclusion.

In essence, Rule 11

directs the appellant to provide the Appeals Court with all
evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Where the record
before the Court of Appeals is incomplete, the Court is unable to
review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the
verdict

was

supported

by

admissible

and

competent

Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App.).

131855
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evidence.

There is ample support in the record before the trial
court which includes the pleadings, affidavits and the testimony at
the

hearings

conclusions

of

to

support

law.

the

Judge's

Nowhere

findings

in Appellant's

of
brief

fact

and

does he

demonstrate that the evidence in the record below does not support
the Court's findings and conclusions. Appellant merely argues that
his testimony should have been more credible to the Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court's granting
summary judgment with respect to Appellant's claim of a gift of the
Krugerrand coins to him and the non-payment of rent due, was proper
as no issue of disputed material fact was produced by the Appellant
in support of such claim.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion to amend since such motion which, even if
granted, would not have materially changed the result. Appellant's
motion for a jury trial was properly denied in that Appellant
failed to comply with statutory requirements and request a jury
trial in a timely fashion.
DATED this

ID

day of November, 1994.

KE&JJf B. ALDE
J . MICHAEL BAILEY
JOHN E . DIAZ

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellee
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